



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



4977

l Educ 2248.29

Vol. 1873.



From H. C. C. C.

AN APOLOGY, &c.

Price 1s. 6d.

LONDON:
IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY-STREET, STRAND.

Rec^d. Sept. 7. 1831.

AN APOLOGY

FOR

THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC AND CLASSICAL EDUCATION.

BY THOMAS MAUDE, ESQ. M. A.

OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD; AND OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE.

“Proceed, great days! till learning fly the shore,
Till birch shall blush with noble blood no more.”—POPE.

LONDON:
J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY.
MDCCCXXVIII.

Educ 2248.28

1831, Sept. 7.
Gift of
Abdiah Ricks,
of London.

EDUCATION.

PERHAPS there is no subject of a general and extensive nature, of which it is so difficult to treat in a general and comprehensive manner, as EDUCATION. In speaking of education in the abstract, it is obvious that allusion is made to that of the *upper classes* in society; though, at the present day, the education of *the lower orders*, adults as well as infants, forms a more prominent, as a more novel, topic of public discussion. That the proper instruction of the latter is a point of national interest and importance, no one capable of holding a sound opinion will deny; and, though the fittest means of carrying the plans of the philanthropist regarding them into

effect may admit of considerable argument, I content myself in this place with wishing well at large to the general cause, and proceed to say something of the education of the higher orders in society, and especially of that mode of instruction which has for many years prevailed in our more liberal seminaries of learning.

But connected with this question of *classical education* (for I need scarcely say that the prevalent system of which I speak is the CLASSICAL system) there has arisen another question, of less "mark and likelihood," but still in itself of great moment, relative to the proper *sphere* in which boys should be educated; in other words, whether they should be reared in public or in private, at home or at school. This question, indeed, is not entirely new; for it was obviously agitated amongst a serious party at the time when the poet of the "Task" tauntingly demanded—

"Would you your son should be a sot or dunce,
Lascivious, headstrong, or all these at once;
That in good time the stripling's finish'd taste,
For loose expense and fashionable waste,
Should prove your ruin—and his own at last;
Train him *in public* with a mob of boys," &c.*

* See "*Tirocinium*."

But at that period the great body of society were not prepared for such scruples; they had not then hurried into the extremes in which our wiser optimists and alarmists expatiate: the spirit of theory had not then unsettled the minds of men; and, if the general results of established practices were tolerably satisfactory, our ancestors never enquired further; they were not haunted or perplexed with those visions of ideal excellence which now prompt all who can think to think for the best, and moreover to endeavour to impress others with their own peculiar convictions. In the main *we* have unquestionably the advantage; generally speaking, we are more liberal, more enlightened than our ancestors; prejudices seem to be wearing out; and, if old *opinion* be still too often found, as Sophocles sagely described it, "stronger than truth," it is at least no longer, with the same depth of shadow,

"an omnipotence, whose veil
Mantles the earth with darkness."

Yet it cannot be denied that there are some features in the moral aspect of the present times, not altogether so pleasing; and amongst these,

perhaps, a manifest and popular tone of disrespect or irreverence for things long respected and revered, is the most obvious and repulsive.

“ I speak not of men’s creeds—they rest between
Man and his Maker—but of things allow’d,
Averr’d, and known”——

To apply Pope’s maxim, of “ whatever *is* right” to human institutions, however venerable, would be to adopt one of the worst principles of the narrowest bigotry ; but, on the other hand, to act respecting these as if the *reverse were true*, is to exhibit a rashness altogether distinct from liberality, and nearly allied to insane, I should rather say, *empty-minded* wantonness.

Κλαῖων φρενώσεις, ὧν φρεῶν ἀντὸς κενός.

The circumspection and care requisite in altering the common law of this country we all know : the wisdom of its parts is evinced by inconveniences almost invariably resulting from any hasty innovation. Now, surely, something approaching to a similar cautiousness would be but becoming in those who interfere with the long-established usages of the country in any

important matter whatever, conventional or not, —above all, in the transcendently important one of education.

The zeal of our era has endeavoured to fix a stigma on the cause of PUBLIC, as well as on that of classical education. Unchecked by any consideration of the general virtue and prosperity of the nation under a long experience of this system, our high-flown and somewhat zealous theorists are quite sure that the vices of the times (which are of course worse than any times preceding) are mainly owing to it. They just know (according to the copy) that “evil communications corrupt good manners,” and logically conclude, that uncorrupt manners would naturally flow from a more restricted plan of education, wherein it would depend on the parents alone (the most interested persons certainly) whether their children should have any influential communications or none; and, if any, whether those should be good or evil. That people unacquainted with the world, and unaccustomed or unable to look to complicated results, (and the latter class of persons constitutes the great mass of society,) should thus weigh and decide the question, is not surprising. There is

about it a speciousness which may be to some minds imposing; but a very little sober consideration, and a glance from the nursery to the world—from the school of principles to the stage of action—will, I suppose, tend powerfully to cool the heated imaginations of the most zealous theorists of private, or the most thorough-paced opponents of public education.

In making these observations, it is almost unnecessary to explain, that I refer simply to the education of *boys*, and of boys in the higher classes alone. The object which I propose to myself at present, therefore, is a brief *illustration* of the two questions on which issue is joined, comprehending a succinct defence of the combined cause of public and classical education. I have only further to premise, that I shall consider the subject in a general light, and maintain *systems* without regard to *details*.

In dividing my subject—(for the two-fold nature of it seems to require something of the old-fashioned style of division)—I shall, *firstly*, consider the question of *private* education; *secondly*, give my own ideas respecting a right system of *public* education.

What, then, are the presumed and boasted

advantages of home education? By some they are confined to *morals*; by others they are extended to *learning* also. Let us examine each of these arguments separately.

First, as to *morals*—I maintain that the true way of estimating the results of moral culture, adopted towards a boy, is by noting the effects of it in his *matured* mind and conduct, without paying much regard to any immediate consequences. My first argument, therefore, is an appeal to *fact*; for it is certain that home-bred youths have not been observed to turn out better than those educated at public schools; nay, I believe it may safely be asserted, that they have generally turned out worse. Nor is this surprising. They enter the world without the shield of human prudence: they are ignorant of themselves, as compared with others: they see things *precariously*, according to the engrafted peculiarities of individual tuition, or the unmitigated selfishness of individual moral nature.

Moreover, self-will and self-importance are rather the growth of home than of school-education. At a great school, boys of rank find themselves jostled in the herd; and, whilst they see that ability and industry are honoured and

rewarded, they know that ignorance and idleness are despised and punished. But where is the *domestic tutor* who will risk the favour of his employers by wholesome discipline? If the parents are indulgent, the boy is pampered and spoiled. The very plainness and rudeness of the food and lodging at schools are morally beneficial; while the reverse of these enervates at once body and mind. Besides, the relation of a domestic tutor to his pupil precludes the exercise of proper authority. A boy should feel that neglect or punishment (and the former will be as effective as the latter with some minds) awaits misconduct; he must not think himself of importance enough to be allowed to trouble an elder and a wiser person with his whims or slackness. But, as it is the proper business and the duty of a domestic tutor to wait on all the moods of his pupil's mind, he *cannot* show that neglect which awakens ingenuous shame, or inflict that punishment which compels obedience. He too often, it is to be feared, descends to humour his pupil's caprices, and labours in vain to coax him into learning.

The moral *advantages* of home education, alleged by its advocates, must in fairness be

opposed to the above-stated moral disadvantages. It cannot be denied, that the sources of the mind are less *polluted* at home than at school. A boy at home neither hears nor sees generally, it is to be hoped, what can contaminate the moral sense. Every virtuous parent must feel with the Roman satirist—

Nil dictu foedum visuque hæc limina tangat,
Intra quæ puer est.—Juv.

But is this exemption from exposure to *accidental* evil (many of whose corruptions are afterwards abjured even by the good sense and polished tone of society)—is this, I demand, an advantage comparable with the eradication of those deep-seated evils of our nature, which spring up into luxuriance in the early hot-bed of home indulgence? Surely not. If moral effeminacy, and its opposite, which we may call *virile virtue*, be in part the products of education, to *which sort* of education must we refer each? I leave the answer of this question to the common sense of such of my readers as know the world.

But self-will, self-importance, and moral effeminacy, are not the only bad effects of private

education : *narrowness* of moral views is also to be apprehended. The boy is brought up, perhaps, with notions on religion virtually sectarian,—with notions in politics that may be right or wrong as it happens, but which have never met the shock of opposition. He is thus condemned to bigotry and intolerance.

I have had opportunities of observing, in the circles of my acquaintance, some amusing and some serious instances of the folly of home-education. I have seen common-place minds abandoning themselves to narrow prejudices in religious faith, derived from the small sect of home, and suffered to strike root too deeply, (from having encountered no salutary collision) ever to be eradicated or meliorated. I have seen common-place minds fierce in party views of politics, unproduced by reflection and unsupported by argument,—or destitute of all political feeling whatever, and matured in the habitual contempt of it. I have seen persons of the former class rendered ridiculous in society, by a sort of engrafted family *assumption*, that their own and their parents' side, whatever it be, is the right one,—and by a habit, in discussing questions, of so expressing themselves. They

would, for instance, ask a perfect stranger, whether such an one "was of the *right side* in politics," and no more dream that the shape of the inquiry was ambiguous, than that George the Fourth could be deemed, like the Grand Turk, brother to the sun and moon.

But, in fact, there is no end to the mischievous and absurd results of home education. Of all disagreeable people the home-spun gentleman is, indeed, the most offensive. He is the *Bliffl* of domestic life, and in public is generally an object either of laughter or contempt.

I shall conclude my enumeration of moral evils, by saying, that when a boy or man so educated *does* fall into pernicious company, he is more likely to be ruined by it. To such an one, in a peculiar degree—"facilis descensus Averni."

Secondly, as to *learning*, I contend that home education is likewise illusive. In all ages, the public education of boys has been recommended by wise and sagacious observers of the human mind. Boys of ordinary capacity find, in the competition of intellects, an antidote to unfounded despair, on the one hand, and to un-

founded presumption on the other. If constitutionally indolent, and yet not dead to shame, they have also, in this competition, a salutary stimulus to exertion. Nothing can be falser than the judgment of those who confound a generous emulation—

“ the spirit of a youth

That means to be of note,”

with the base spirit of personal envy. The wise and virtuous father of our incomparable Sir Philip Sidney strongly incited his son, when a boy, to the cultivation of a virtuous ambition : and the reverend and respectable biographer of that accomplished hero, Dr. Zouch, speaks of this sound advice in terms of the highest commendation, and of such an ambition itself, as of a thing which all young men should possess and cherish. On the same principle, too, all well-conditioned boys should cultivate a spirit of generous emulation. And emulation is, in the earlier part of his career, the soul of a talented boy's studies at school. *Μαλιστα μεν περι τιμας και ατιμας ο μεγαλοφυχος εστι.*—ARIST. It is not the feeble and puerile de-

sire to obtain the compromised approbation of a flattering domestic tutor, as he replies (whilst paring a slice of pine at dessert) to the casual inquiries of mamma or papa; but it is the nobler desire to win the applause of an independent and impartial public master!—applause, heightened into *distinction* by the consideration that it is bestowed as a mark of conduct or proficiency, estimated *comparatively* with the qualifications of a hundred minds busied around him. What is this, but an incentive to excellence? And aspirations after excellence are, in themselves, a part of virtue. *Who*, also, will say that ordinary minds are likely to make equal advances “in literis humanioribus,” *without* this incentive?

Thus, generally, I affirm that greater progress is made in studies, of whatever nature, at school than at home. Either emulation or compulsion is necessary with most boys as a spur; but at home the former does not exist, or assumes its most questionable character amongst brothers; and anything like the regularity and coercion in study exhibited in great schools is impracticable, and perhaps undesirable, in the milder sphere of parental superintendence.

I maintain, moreover, that the simple *plan*

of education pursued at our great schools is more adapted to a boy's *intellectual advancement*. A domestic tutor naturally, and as a matter of duty, endeavours to guide and direct the *taste*, as well as to lay the basis of learning. Now this method is, to say the least, precarious; since, if the tutor's own taste be limited or deficient, it will impede the pupil's mental researches, (always supposing him to be a boy of merely *ordinary* capacity, as *extraordinary* minds are beyond the calculations of tutorial sagacity,) and, if the tutor's taste be vicious, it will mislead the mind (*cereum flecti*) of the common-place pupil. How much better and safer is it to leave the taste to its own workings, however feeble! to place the *finest models* of human learning, which are not of one country or of one age, before the youthful mind, without assuming the power of dictatorial direction in provinces where there is no legitimate dictatorship! *Then* the impressions of taste and feeling come naturally, if at all; the powers of the infant judgment are invigorated by self-exercise; and, if conclusions drawn *be* sometimes faulty, at least the young spirit takes its own *bent*—un-cramped and unchilled! A mind thus nurtured

is much less a *parrot* in sentiment, than one early nauseated and overborne by eternally officious tutorship.

I conclude this part of my subject with an illustration. Take two boys, one educated at home, the other at school, into your library. The honest schoolboy will, with straight forward modesty, translate at your bidding a passage out of Homer or Livy; whilst the home-bred paragon talks away with marvellous ease and confidence, and contents himself with giving proof of his *taste*, in observing that the style of Virgil is chaster, *he believes*, than that of Statius; or of his *knowledge*, in telling you that Thucydides is, *he believes*, more to be depended upon than Diodorus. Things true enough in themselves; but which in our young gentleman's mouth are no more argument of scholarship, than the expression "unrivalled dramatist," applied to Shakspeare, is, in the mouth of *Sir Plume*, argument of taste in poetry.

Having thus asserted the superiority of school over home, or rather of public over private education, in respect both to morals and learning, (the two grand objects of all education whatever,) I now come to the *second* division

of my entire subject, and proceed to give (con-
cisely) my own ideas respecting a *right system*
of public tuition.

I begin by stating that I advocate, on the
main, that system of *classical* instruction which
has been long pursued in our great schools and
universities, especially Oxford,*—

—————“in whose halls are hung
Armoury of the invincible knights of old.”

I know that, in so doing, I shall be
thought by many to oppose (when, in fact, it is
my zealous wish to aid) the march of improve-
ment—that I gainsay some ephemeral doctrines,
maintained by men who fancy themselves the
champions of philosophy, and of course ap-
plauded to the echo by those to whose “busi-

* I have before said that I speak of *systems* at large, without
regard to *details*. Many points of detail in the Oxford system
are, I freely admit, wholly indefensible. I will specify one;
namely, the custom of placing the names of the conspicuously
efficient amongst the *candidates for a mere degree-pass* in the
list (of course at the fag end) of *candidates for honours*; thereby
doing flagrant and infamous injustice to the former, some of
whom are, in reality, men of distinguished talent. Nothing
can be said in justification of the injurious *falsehood* of this
recent practice, which originated in the cold-hearted pedantry
of the Examining Masters, and has been too long uncensured
by the higher powers.

nesses and bosoms" they are addressed—namely the cloud of uneducated upstarts. These, doubtless, receive due consolation from doctrines, however absurd, that decry the learning in which they are deficient, and hold up to their admiring apprehension the marvellous importance and utility of a smattering in those *scioleutiæ*, half a dozen of which may be crammed in a week, and convert so many otherwise impenetrable dunces into so many enlightened natural philosophers, by the simplest process imaginable.

But, though I set out with a quotation in verse, that marks my veneration for our old classical institutions, I shall not dwell on the reverence due to systems long approved—systems which have been the leading cause of our present justly-boasted national illumination, and the abandonment of which would throw us back to something like the barbarism from which they rescued us. No! as I maintain them on the strength of their intrinsic excellence, I shall endeavour to prove by argument, (and *one* will suffice,) that the classical system of public education is the best one.

It will be understood that I strictly confine my remarks to boy-education—to the discipline

of the immature intellect—in short, to school education. The education of the matured mind should be going on through life. The extensiveness and the variety of human science are sufficient for the life-labours at once of the most active and of the most comprehensive intellect. At school a *basis* is to be laid: in the world the *superstructure* is to be reared. The question, then, is *not*—What are the sciences or branches of knowledge that man ought to be acquainted with? but—What is the *basis of universal learning*? what is that part of learning which can be acquired best in early youth, and which, when acquired, is (as a contemporary metaphysician elegantly expresses it,) “the armoury of the mind,” subservient to its future conquests? In the *one answer* to this question (the propriety of which cannot, I suppose, be disputed,) is comprised my grand argument. That answer is—LANGUAGE. *With* this armoury, a man may make conquests at will, according to his genius, in any region of science; *without* it, he is perpetually let and hindered in his higher pursuits, of whatever nature.

He who admits this argument must, I pre-

sume, likewise admit the consummate excellency (to this end) of *classical* institutions. For whence is *our* literature—whence is the literature of Europe derived? Need we at last say, from Greece and Rome? Need we at last extol that renowned country in particular, “quæ semper eloquentiæ princeps esse voluit, atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas, in quibus summa dicendi vis et inventa est et perfecta?”* Need any one, acquainted with the first principles of language, be told that *our* language wants that definite grammatical precision of construction which the learned languages so luminously possess? that the beauty even of our periods is reflected from theirs? “Orationem nostram illorum tactu quasi colorari?” that the intricate parts of English construction are perceived only in *idea*—*idea*, too, perceptible to those alone who know the actual grammatical image in classic forms? that all the higher parts of our speech are compounds from the Greek or the Latin? that perfection in language (as in the sciences and every elegant art,) was once “confined to the little territory of Greece,” and is now felt, *in influence*, “only by

* Cic. de Orat. lib. i. 4.

those nations," as the learned Mitford observes, "which have derived it thence?"

In saying this, do we depreciate our own admirable language, which yields to the *Greek alone* in flexibility and copiousness? Far from it! That language which has been immortally illustrated by a Shakspeare, a Milton, and a Byron, (successively leaving behind them stupendous monuments of original genius, equal to any left by the master-spirits of old Greece and Rome,) is surely safe from depreciation. In truth, considering the unquestionably superior *originality* of our bards, we, more truly than "the lyric Roman," may affirm with pride—

" Nil intentatum nostri liquere poëtæ,
Nec minimum meruere decus, vestigia Græca
Ausi deserere."

But we must not forget that the diffusion of classic models led to the construction and to the development of all our modern European languages. Whilst we rapturously allow, and proudly assert, the copiousness and the flexibility of *our own* in particular, we must not blindly deny that it is of *barbarous* origin; and that, however enlarged, regulated, and refined by classic influence, it *essentially* wants classic

precision. Of this assertion I could readily adduce a thousand proofs ; but to a scholar they would be superfluous, and to one who is no scholar unintelligible.

“ But why,” it may be asked, “ should the education of boys at our great schools be restricted to an almost *exclusively* classical course ?” Because (I answer) the classical course is the philosophical high road of language ;—because boyhood is the proper time for making such elementary acquisitions ;—because minds, if worth any thing, will and must, of themselves, make other useful acquisitions in after life ;—and because we see that, even as it is, with all the exclusiveness of the system, but few young men, comparatively speaking, become adequately proficient in classic learning. If language be, as it is, in the most extensive sense, the *fount* and *basis* of learning, let language continue to be, as it is in England, the principal business of all great schools instituted for boys intended to move in the polite classes. And, as no man can possibly be said to be a master of his own language without some knowledge of the classic languages, let the *classic*

languages be the great sources of instruction *in language*.

Some shallow objectors cite that marvellous child of inspiration, and "great heir of fame," Shakspeare—as a consummate master of his own language (at least in the practical use of it,) and yet probably deficient in classical knowledge. *Probably!*—We know not the extent of Shakspeare's learning. He undoubtedly, however, possessed some knowledge of *Latin*. His Roman plays alone would prove this; and what say the sceptics on this subject to the apt quotation, in the *second part of King Henry VI.* which Gloster addresses to Cardinal Beaufort—

"Tantæne animis cœlestibus iræ?
Churchmen so hot?"—Act II. sc. I.

This by the way :—it is wholly unnecessary to our argument. Minds like that of *Shakspeare* (if indeed there ever existed beneath the heavens another human mind like his) are *no rule*. They are extraordinary in all their capacities, and surpass calculation :—they are in themselves classics and models—creators and legislators

in their several provinces. "But," as Mr. Campbell finely observes, in his truly classical *Essay on English Poetry*, "those phenomena of poetical inspiration are, in fact, still dependant on the laws and light of the system which they visit." Again, the same distinguished writer, equally eminent as a critic and as a poet, justly remarks—"Shakspeare's genius was certainly indebted to the intelligence and moral principles which existed in his age; and to that intelligence and to those moral principles *the revival of classical literature* undoubtedly contributed."—*Essay*, p. 107.

But Shakspeare is, as I have already observed, out of the question. In general arguments, *ordinary* minds alone must be instanced. Relax the system of classical education one jot, and our ordinary men and writers will relapse into inaccuracy and barbarism. "Ac primo quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam viam, neque aliquod præceptum artis esse arbitrantur, tantum, quantum ingenio et cogitatione poterant, consequentur. Post autem, auditis oratoribus Græcis"—it is Tully who writes—"cognitisque eorum literis, adhibitisque doctoribus, incredibili quodam nos-

tri homines"—so likewise our own countrymen—"dicendi studio flagrauerunt." The spirit of these words is of course applicable to the history of *general* learning in this country.

Let us not, then, abandon, in the spring-tide of our glory, what has contributed so mainly to the perfection of it. *Words are things*—communicative and representative symbols; and the fundamental theory, of which I am speaking, essentially aids the precision and the right understanding—not only of language *abstractedly* considered—but of all truths in science and even in morals.

Perhaps it is not generally known, at least amongst the low-minded assailants of the old classical system, that all the great and public schools, over which eminent Cambridge mathematicians preside, follow the same course of almost exclusively classical instruction. Yet, from these schools, so conducted, the ranks of *Wranglers* are filled. In truth, I know many instances of young men going to Cambridge, and there distinguishing themselves in science, who have left such schools without any mathematical preparation whatever. The fact is, that a long and gradual course of classical instruction or

study is requisite to any thing like the education of a scholar; while the scientific attainments of a senior wrangler may be achieved, by the minds for which they are destined, in the space of three years—a university career. The opponents of classical schools would also do well to recollect, that classical learning is eminently serviceable, if not indispensably requisite, to the attainment of a distinguished place in science. The great scientific authors composed their works chiefly in Latin; and the ordinary language of science is helped out by terms compounded from the Greek. Away then with the drivelling cant and trash spoken and written against our ancient classical institutions! Science and literature are allies as ancient as Aristotle;—but literature is the concern of all moving, or pretending to move, in polite life; whilst science (in the grand and high sense of the word) can be pursued but by few, comparatively, with even a chance of profit or success. The question at any rate comes to this—which are to be pursued *first*? The classics or the sciences? Are the latter to be forcibly administered to boys who have as yet discovered no taste for any thing, as Doctor Johnson saith, “but an apple-pie or a peg-top,”—and, above all, who

are as yet unequipped with the armoury of language? Is it not rather obvious to every body, except an uneducated sciolist, that the old system of public education is the right one? that it is best to make boys scholars, if possible, at school,—to crown their scholarship, or to leave science open to them, at the University? Oxford has long aimed to do both; and Cambridge has of late, with laudable zeal, become emulous of her rival's high example in this respect. The latter University felt, under her old system, in which there were no *public classical* examinations, that her sons could leave the banks of Cam with degrees in Arts, yet with something not much better, more liberal, or more elevated, than the education of writing-masters. She saw the necessity of remedying this great evil, and made the classics essential to a simple degree.

But to return:—with regard to those schools or academies, commonly ycleped “Classical and Commercial,” (in which the languages, the sciences, and heaven knows how many other *useful* things are taught,) have we observed that the *alumni* of such establishments shine in after life, more than those of our great exclusive schools? Is it not notorious that the *reverse* is the fact, and to a degree not accounted for by

any presumed difference in the qualifications of the masters? The system—the hotch-potch system is in fault. The gross multitude speedily forget their smattering of science; and what have they left in its place? Whereas, if the majority of our well-educated gentry leave, as is said, their *learning* at college, do they not—(I put it to the candour of my readers)—do they not, as a body, retain to the last something of *classical influence*? akin to that “ Ionian elegance” which our late illustrious poet speaks of as sprinkled by the very charm of the clime over the mind of a Greek pirate.

But it is not only on the ground of language, of taste, and of humanized feeling, that I strongly advocate the ancient system pursued in our great schools;—I advocate it, also, on the score of sense, of judgment, of mental expansion, of intellectual advancement, of argument; and, in a word, of *philosophy*. “ The object of a public teacher,” as the sagacious and venerable Dugald Stewart observes,* “ is no longer to incul-

* In his *Essay on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy*, since the revival of letters in Europe.

cate a particular system of dogmas, but to prepare his pupils for exercising their own judgments." Now this great object is especially answered by the early study of *language*,—therefore of those perfect *models* of language which are above detraction or praise. It will not, I suppose, be disputed, that there exists a philosophical connexion between our *ideas* and the *symbols* that represent them; that a clear and distinct intelligence of the latter brightens and multiplies the former; that they *reflect images* to each other, as art to art. Even *Horne Tooke* was not far wrong, when he asserted—"I consider *grammar* as absolutely necessary in the search after philosophical truth, and I think it not less necessary in the most important questions concerning religion and civil society." A much higher authority, *Dr. Johnson*, was of the same opinion; but he, I scarcely need add, with his natural abhorrence of empiricism, built *his system* on the only sure basis, and adhered, in his philosophical philology, to those *ever-living languages*, which have been perpetuated in the works of consummate genius,—the illustrious *sources* of European language and learning,—

“ Boast of the aged ! lesson of the young !
 Which sages venerate, and bards adore,
 As Pallas and the Muse unveil their awful lore !”

I apprehend that there is no greater mistake than that, under the delusion of which some people imagine, that the *mathematics* are more favourable, in their general influence, to sound judgment or sound argument, than the classics. Here again the reverse is the fact. *Mere* mathematicians are of all men the least capable of general argument. They must in every case have things *demonstrated* step by step; and they are unable to look an inch beyond a demonstration. Moral philosophy is of course another thing; and the pursuit of this is confessedly aided in no small degree by the precision of classical learning. In truth, the classics confirm, assist, and develop the powers of argument and of general intellectual comprehension far more than their presumed rival. It is, I assert, an utter mistake of ignorance to suppose for a moment that they are less bracing, or less auxiliary, to the general faculties. We do not read Aristotle so much for any moral benefits derivable from the conclusions of his ethical science, as for the exercise which the study of that

most subtle and acute writer gives to the intellect. For myself, if I would witness elegance and soundness of learning, quickness and hardness of intellect, with tried exercise of the various mental powers, whether perceptive or argumentative,—commend me to the man who; in the spirit of severe scholarship and Attic taste, is learnedly familiar with the tragic bards of Athens, with the historian of the Peloponnesian war, and with the mighty preceptor of Alexander.

Even from the accurate practice of what is usually termed *construing* ancient authors, the deepest and most lasting advantage is derivable; an advantage that seems still essential (and long may it continue so!) to any man desirous of distinguishing himself in the liberal professions, in literature, or in the senate. Perhaps the authority of Cicero on this point is not yet too antiquated for consideration. “Mihi placuit,” observes that illustrious man, “eoque sum usus adolescens, ut summorum oratorum Græcas orationes explicarem; quibus lectis hoc assequerbar, ut, cum ea, quæ legerem Græcè, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uterer, et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quædam

verba imitando, quæ nova nostris essent, dummodo essent idonea." Thus we see that, by the ancient practice of *construing*, the prince of Roman eloquence was enabled, not only to shape and adorn his own mind, but to enrich the language of his country. Thus, too, have our great *men* been fashioned—thus has our *language* been, from time to time, enriched. In this familiar practice, moreover, the general faculties of the mind are called at once into salutary exercise; and any person, at all acquainted with the matter, will readily acknowledge, that to excel in this art alone demands a quick, a collected, a comprehensive, and (in the broad *Grecian* sense of the expression) a philosophical mind. Therefore, on the high ground of ancient authority and of modern experience, I advocate the simple classical system, of which I have been speaking—"non quo acui," (if I may again cite the words of the all-eloquent Roman) "ingenia adolescentium nollemus, sed contra, ingenia obtundi nolimus, corroborari impudentiam. Nam apud Græcos, cujusmodi essent, videbamus tamen esse, præter hanc exercitationem linguæ, doctrinam aliquam, et humanitatem dignam scientia: hos vero novos ma-

gistros nihil intelligebamus posse docere, nisi ut auderent; quod, etiam cum bonis rebus conjunctum, per se ipsum est magnopere fugiendum.”—“ Quamobrem pergite”---(I add, from another *Dialogue* of the same superb work)---“ pergite ut facitis, adolescentes, atque in id studium, in quo estis, incumbite; ut et vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublicæ emolumento esse possitis.”

In concluding my remarks on this important subject, I hardly know whether those persons deserve an answer, who seem eternally to argue that all things are useless which do not contribute to the *substantial* necessaries and conveniences of life. Persons of this stamp go on the solitary idea that “man lives by bread alone.” Hence they perceive the value of arithmetic and of the mechanical arts. But they can no more comprehend and grasp a question in its moral and intellectual bearings, than a bat can examine the sun’s disk. They see the virtues of agriculture, and of commerce: they can tell you what is, and what is not, politico-economically *productive*; but they fail to perceive that this *productiveness* is not all in all,—that a state *may* be at once wealthy and inglorious,---

that intellectual things, in short, are better than material,—that intellectual and moral greatness in the heart of a state is better than the wealth of both the Indies in its coffers. The true patriot and philosopher aims to *unite* the two; he will not exalt one consideration at the expense of the other; but, if between the two a collision were to take place, the politico-economical consideration of national wealth would be, in his view, as dust in the balance with the higher consideration of intellectual and moral greatness.

Bad professors of arts or sciences do greater injury to them than their worst enemies. The soi-disans political economists of the day injure the estimation of their favourite science, as much as the brood of unfledged rhymesters injure the cause of poetry. They lose it and themselves in a wilful mal-application of their great doctrine of *utility*, and in a prostitution of it to every impracticable purpose. The lower orders of these people talk of nothing but the baser advantages. Respecting *literary* men, for example—what signifies the idle dispute whether they are a *productive* race or not? Productive of what? Of *capital*, forsooth! Why, even in that respect I am inclined to think, with the great northern genius, that they are productive:—at

D

least, if creators of employment be creators of capital, (which is, I am aware, questioned,) great authors are creators of capital. At all events, whatever quickens the industry of a community in any branch of trade or of manufacture, is assuredly conducive to the wealth and comfort of that community. But in authorship (I speak of great authors alone) this consideration of *wealth* is the lowest, and merely a collateral consideration. The end and the aim of literature are moral and intellectual objects. No pence or praise can balance the account between a great author and his readers. They are for ever, and in spite of any remuneration, his *debtors*. To popular literature the present elevated feeling and polished tone of society *owe their very existence*. You see the effects of it in every place of public resort, and in every private dwelling-house. Great authors are in deed and in truth creators,—if of *wealth*, well and good,—if not, creators in mind and in morals; benefactors, if not to the exchequer, yet (what is of infinitely greater consequence,) to the heart and soul of a community.*

* This view of the question is, I observe with pleasure, taken by Mr. Malthus. "To estimate," he observes, "the value of Newton's discoveries, or the delight communicated by

I have been led into the above slight digression from our main subject, in endeavouring to combat the *spirit* which prompts a *certain order* of persons to oppose and vilify the classical system of education. "Of what *use* are the classics?" demand these vulgar drivellers. In reply, I must obviously adduce something smacking of worldly advantage. "Erant autem huic studio maxima, quæ nunc quoque sunt, exposita præmia, vel ad gratiam, vel ad opes, vel ad dignitatem." I therefore point to the late Mr. *Canning*, and say, without fear of contradiction, that the "elegantia doctrinæ"—the early influence of classical literature acting upon his natural genius—made him what he was—the

Shakspeare and Milton, by the *price* at which their works have sold, would be but a poor measure of the degree in which they have elevated and enchanted their country!"—*Principles of Political Economy*.

The same eminent writer confesses therefore, that "some unproductive labour is of much more use and importance than productive labour, but is incapable of being the subject of the gross calculations which relate to national wealth; contributing to other sources of happiness besides those which are derived from matter." The *Edinburgh Review* also has recently done itself credit by giving a side-blow or two at the intolerable jargonists, of whose alliance the higher order of political economists must be thoroughly sick and ashamed.

first orator of his time in the British parliament.

But I have done. To decry the early study of the classics, as a basis of male education, is in effect to wish to banish whatever is chastely brilliant or elevating from the debates in Parliament—whatever is auxiliary to the development and polish of genius in literature and in science—all in short that has made the world of taste and of letters what it is. Take away this *chief corner-stone*, and the temple of our future glories will be a slovenly, unregulated pile, devoid of grace, and devoted to oblivion.

ὄρῳ γὰρ ἤβην, τὴν μὲν ἔρπουσαν πρόσω,
τὴν δὲ φθίνουσαν ὣν ἀφαρπάζειν φιλεῖ
ὀφθαλμὸς ἄνθος, ΤΩΝΔ' ΥΠΕΚΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ ΠΟΔΑ.

SOPHOCLES.

THE END.

LONDON
IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAYOY STREET, STRAND.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

Just published in 8vo. Price One Shilling,

THE MEMORIAL.—*Second Edition.*

ARGUMENT.

First View of the Scottish Border.—Feelings on entering Scotland.—Lammermuir.—Wolf's Hope.—Youthful Fancies respecting Scotland, and some of their Sources.—Associated Recollections of a Lost Friend and School-Fellow, Native of Perthshire.—Early Love and Pursuit of Poetry—yet unrelinquished. Here the author (in prosecution of his *design*, which is a brief illustration, from personal experience, of Gray's "hues unborrowed of the sun") proceeds to give the impressions produced on the poetical mind, presuming that his own is such, from a contemplation of scenes hallowed by the abode or by the strains of genius.—Stratford-on-Avon.—Penhurst in Kent.—Dell of North Eake in Mid Lothian.—These "orient hues" exist, to the poetical perception, in every clime.—Lights of Greece—of Rome—of Modern Italy. Not limited to regions of ancient renown, the Muse exults wherever Freedom triumphs.—South America.—Conclusion.

"In the course of our volume for 1823, we had an opportunity of examining the poetical pretensions of Mr. Maude, and we pronounced them of no inferior order; and in our 435th number that opinion was re-iterated in yet stronger terms, on the appearance of the first edition of the Memorial. Having on that occasion done justice to the polished elegance and true poetical feeling of this little volume, we have now only to express our pleasure at the public acknowledgment of Mr. Maude's genius which the appearance of a new edition implies."—*Literary Chronicle*, March 8, 1828.

ALSO, BY THE SAME AUTHOR,

MISCELLANEOUS POEMS,

INCLUDING THE

*Legend of Ravenswood, and the Village Grammar
School.*

8vo. 9s. 6d. Hatchards.

"The Universities seem anxious to wipe away the reproach, which they have so long lain under, of having furnished few ornaments to the literature or science of the country. Mr. Maude affords many instances of genius."—*Literary Chronicle*, 1823.

"Mr. Maude writes like a gentleman and a scholar; and in these days, when so many, who are neither gentlemen nor scholars, will pour their flood of rhyme over an innocent and defenceless public, this is no mean praise. The volume before us displays great warmth and depth of feeling—the best source of the sort of poetry it contains. The whole is extremely creditable to the writer's taste and sentiments."—*Literary Museum*, 1823.

"The lovers of poetry will find in the beauties of this little volume a rich treat. We were particularly delighted with the *Parting Hour*."—*Monthly Critical Gazette*, 1824.

"There is an ethical propriety, a correctness of feeling, &c. (in the *Village Grammar School*,) that reminds us in many respects of Cowper.—Preface an agreeable specimen of easy and unaffected writing."—*Monthly Review*, 1824.

"There is much sterling poetry in this little collection. In the first and longest poem (the *Village Grammar School*) there is a youthful vigour and freshness, &c. There is much, too, of the affecting tenderness of Goldsmith in the descriptions of the innocent amusements of happy boyhood, and in the pure enjoyments of rural quiet and domestic privacy."—*Gent. Magazine*, 1824.

LIST OF NEW BOOKS,

PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187,
PICCADILLY.

I.

The **EPISTLE** of **PAUL** the **APOSTLE** to the **ROMANS**; with an Introduction, Paraphrase, and Notes. By **C. H. TERROT**, A.M. late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. 9s. bds.

II.

A **BRIEF ENQUIRY** into the **PROSPECTS** of the **CHURCH** of **CHRIST** in connexion with the second Advent of our Lord Jesus Christ. By the Hon. **GERARD NOEL**, A.M. Curate of Richmond, Surrey. 8vo. 9s. boards.

III.

CONSISTENCY; By **CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH**, Author of "Osric," "Rachel," &c. Second Edition. 18mo. 2s. 6d. boards.

IV.

POETRY of the **ANTI-JACOBIN**. Sixth Edition. Foolscap 8vo. 7s. 6d. bds.

V.

SERMONS adapted for Family Reading. By the Rev. **JOHN EDMUND JONES**, M.A. of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford; late Curate of St. Nicholas, and Lecturer at St. John's, Gloucester. Second Edition. 12mo. 6s. boards.

New Books, Published by J. Hatchard and Son.

VI.

HINTS, designed to promote a Profitable Attendance on an Evangelical Ministry. By the Rev. W. DAVIS. 18mo. 2s. 6d. bds.

VII.

VILLAGE INCIDENTS; or, Religious Influence in Domestic Scenes. By a Lady. 12mo. 3s. 6d. bds.

VIII.

CHURCH PATRONAGE. A Letter to the Right Hon. ROBERT PEEL, M.P. &c. By a Son of the Church. 8vo. 2s. 6d. sewed.

IX.

OBSERVATIONS on the IMPORTATION of FOREIGN CORN, with the Resolutions moved by LORD REDESDALE in the House of Lords, March 29, 1827, and his Speech thereupon, May 16, 1827, with some notice of Observations then made on those Resolutions; and also Remarks upon an Act permitting Importation of Corn, Meal, and Flour, until May 1, 1828. 8vo. 3s. sewed.

X.


SERMONS and **EXTRACTS** Consolatory on the Loss of Friends: selected from the Works of the most eminent Divines. Third Edition. 8vo. 12s. boards.

XI.

An **ESTIMATE** of the HUMAN MIND; being a Philosophical Inquiry into the legitimate application and extent of its leading Faculties, as connected with the Principles and Obligations of the Christian Religion. By the Rev. J. DAVIES of Queen's College, Cambridge. 2 vols. 8vo. 18s. bds.

XII.

FOUR SERMONS on Subjects relating to the Christian Ministry, and preached on different occasions. By the Rev. JOHN BIRD SUMNER, M.A. Prebendary of Durham, and Vicar of Mapledurham, Oxon. 8vo. 3s. sewed.



Educ 2248.28

An apology for the system of public
Widener Library 006028694



3 2044 079 732 798